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NOTES
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY UNDER THE FAILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993: A SENSELESS
DETOUR ON THE ROAD TO A FLEXIBLE
WORKPLACE
INTRODUCTION
The 1996 presidential election presented the American
people with their first clear view of the politics of gender.1 The
reelection of President William J. Clinton, who campaigned on
the strength of his domestic record, reflected a gender gap of
historic proportion:2 men as a class preferred former Senator
Robert Dole, Clinton's opponent, forty-four to forty-three per-
cent, while women preferred Clinton fifty-four to thirty-seven
percent.3 The vast difference between the votes of men and
women was attributed to the focus of the Democratic party on
women's issues.4
' See Ellen Goodman, Victory at the Gender Gap, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1996,
at A25.
2 See Lynn Sweet, Women Use Clout at Voting Booth, Cal. SUN-TZIE, Nov. 7,
1996, at 4.
s Id. See also Goodman, supra note 1, at A25.
'See Linda Feldman, GOP Spoke of Soccer Moms, Democrats Spohe to Them,
CHISTIAN SCL MONrrOR, Nov. 13, 1996, at 3. In 1995, President Clinton had
organized the White House's first-ever office on women's issues. Id.
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Among Clinton's most potent campaign issues' was his
proposal to expand the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
("FMIA"). Clinton reinforced his support of the FILA with
his advocacy of other traditional "women's issues," such as
education and extended hospital stays for new mothers.' The
FMILA became an issue that clearly separated Clinton from his
Republican opponent in the minds of the electorate. During the
campaign, Dole criticized the Act, claiming that it had hurt
small businesses.' A strident opponent of the legislation while
he was a senator,' Dole promised on the campaign trail that if
elected he would work to repeal the FMLA.0
However, even now, nearly two years after Clinton's elec-
tion victory, talk of expanding the FMLA"' seems premature
considering the myriad of FMLA issues that are still being
settled in the courts.' One issue of particular importance for
businesses and their employees is whether an individual, such
' Hilary Stout, Clinton to Seek Wider Family-Leave Law, WALL ST. J., June
25, 1996, at A2. According to the New York Times, while on the campaign trail
Clinton spoke daily about the FMLA. See Francis X. Clines, Goodbye, and Mostly
Good Riddance, N.Y. TIiES, Nov. 15, 1996, at A28.
G 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
See Goodman, supra note 1; Sweet, supra note 2.
S George E. Condon Jr. & Mark Z. Barabak, Dole's Long Campaign Rarely
Connected; Strikeouts Came More Often than Hits, Aide Admits, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBuNE, Nov. 9, 1996, at A21. As of February 1, 1997, the Labor Department
had reported that it had received only 6,346 FMLA complaints during the past
four years. The agency said almost all the complaints had been resolved, and
officials have only had to take legal action in 16 cases. See Meisler, infra, note 10.
9 139 CONG. REC. S1254, 1254-55 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Dole).
"0 See Feldman, supra note 4, at 3. One moderate Republican expressed frus-
tration at Dole's attacks on the FMLA, which polls showed was very popular with
voters. Feldman, supra note 4, at 3. "Dole was out there ridiculing the [FMLAI,
calling it the 'long arm of the government." Dick Polman, Women Won It for
Clinton; GOP Loss Blamed on Biggest Gender Gap, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Nov.
10, 1996, at Al. See also Stanley Meisler, Clinton Wants Wider Leave Act, He
Plans to Tell More of Benefits, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 2, 1997, at A14.
" See Meisler, supra note 10.
12 Areas of conflict with which courts have grappled include questions of what
constitutes a serious illness under the FMLA (George v. Associated Stationers, 932
F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio June 3, 1996), Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp.
253 (N.D. Miss. 1995)); whether an employee must expressly invoke FMLA protec-
tion when requesting leave (Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 763
(5th Cir. 1995)); and various questions surrounding the proper methods of calcula-
tion to determine the eligibility of employees to take FMLA-protected leave and
the applicability of the statute to employers (McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap
Co., No. Civ.A. 95-1175, 1995 WL 311393 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995).
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as a supervisor, may be held personally liable for violations of
the Family and Medical Leave Act. To those who opposed the
FMLA because of the enormity of its potential costs, such as
former Senator Dole, the notion of individual liability for
FMIA violations is alarming. Similarly, even for the Acts
supporters, who initially conceived of the Act as a way to fight
discrimination against women in the workplace,' the notion
likely seems strange.
To date, the issue of individual liabilityW ' versus business
entity liability 5 has not been addressed by any circuit court
of appeals. The question of individual liability hinges on the
definition of the word "employer" in the statute, the meaning
of which, as interpreted by district courts in several jurisdic-
tions and the Department of Labor, is still unclear. This Note
will recommend that the meaning of the term "employer," and
hence liability under the FMLA, be limited to the corporate
entity. Restricting liability to the corporate entity will protect
managers and supervisors from considerable exposure for their
mere compliance with corporate policies, while encouraging
corporate policymakers to faithfully implement and comply
with the family-friendly policies of the FMLA. Such a restric-
tion will also lead to greater social and economic efficiency in
the administration of the FILA.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of the
history, provisions and purpose of the FMLA and, to the extent
that it is discernible, will examine the intent of Congress re-
garding individual versus business liability. Part 11 discusses
the definitional problems surrounding the term "employer" in
See infra Part I.B.
14 The term "individual liability" or 'supervisory liability' in this Note refers to
the liability of persons who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition of 'em-
ployer" under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)[i) (1994), which defines the term to mean
"any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20
or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year." This defi-
nition includes "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an
employer to any of the employees of such employer. .. ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(4)(a)(ii) (1994). In other words, individual liability does not refer to the
liability of a sole proprietor who otherwise fits the statutory definition of "employ-
er."
e1 The term "business entity liability" or 'business liability' refers to the liabili-




the FMLA. This Part also analyzes the Department of Labor's
FMLA implementing regulations, and evaluates case law inter-
preting the statute's liability provisions. This Part concludes
that district courts interpreting the FMLA have failed to con-
duct a thorough, independent examination of the statute, and
have been too quick to rely upon the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA7), to decide the liability issue of the FMLA. In order to
fully distinguish the FMLA from the FLSA, Part III provides a
brief history of the FLSA, its provisions, and its status regard-
ing supervisory liability. Finally, Part IV recommends that
courts refuse to hold individual supervisors personally liable
for FMLA violations and instead restrict liability to the corpo-
rate entity.
I. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993
A. Provisions and Protections
The Family and Medical Leave Act guarantees up to
twelve weeks of unpaid leave to an eligible employee" of a
qualified employer" for the birth or adoption of a child or to
care for one's own serious medical condition, or that of one's
child, spouse or parent. 8 During FMLA protected leave, the
employee is entitled to have his or her health benefits main-
tained.' 9 When the employee returns to work, he or she is to
be restored to the same position, or given an equivalent posi-
tion within the business, with salary and benefits equal to
16 An eligible employee is one who has been employed by his or her employer
for at least twelve months and has worked for at least 1250 hours during the
twelve-month period which immediately precedes the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)
(1994). See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (1997).
17 A qualified employer is "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry
affecting commerce, who employs fifty or more employees for each working day
during each of twenty or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1994). See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a)
(1997). The Act also covers public agencies and public and private elementary and
secondary schools, regardless of the number of employees. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a)
(1997).
18 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a) (1997).
1'9 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(b) (1997). However, if the
employee fails to return to work following FMLA leave, the employer may recover
the premium that was paid on behalf of the employee to maintain the employee's
health insurance coverage during the unpaid leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(2) (1994).
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those enjoyed in the previous position."0 These protections
form the essence of the FNILA.
Employers have an afirmative duty under the FMLA to
avoid discriminating against employees with family responsi-
bilities."' Employers also are prohibited from retaliating or
discriminating against any employee who "oppose[s] any prac-
tice made unlawful by this [statute].' The Act thus provides
an employee with a present entitlement to family and/or medi-
cal leave, and prohibits subsequent retaliatory discrimination
against an employee who becomes involved in an FMLA suit.
This two-tiered structure of the Act-imposing an afrmative
duty on an employer to allow an employee to take leave, and
imposing a duty not to discriminate-has produced a two-
tiered formula for making out a prima facie case under the
FMI.LA. For example, if an employer breaches its afirmative
duty under section 2615(a) of the F1VILA, in order to demon-
strate a prima facie case an employee must "establish (1) enti-
tlement to leave as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), and (2)
that such entitlement to leave was interfered with by the em-
ployer in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615."' However, if an em-
ployee takes F1VILA protected leave and subsequently faces
workplace discrimination, the employee must show that:
he or she is protected by the FMLA, that he or she suffered an ad-
verse employment decision, and either that the plaintiff was treated
less favorably than an employee who had not requested leave under
the FMLA or that the adverse decision was made because of the
plaintiff's request for leave. 4
The difference between what plaintiffs must demonstrate in
order to make out a prima facie case under the FMLA, for
20 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 825.100(c) (1997).
21 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any
right provided under this subchapter.").
2 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (1994). It is also unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee who brings suit under the Act, or otherwise participates
in a proceeding brought against the employer under the Act. 29 US.C. § 2615(b)
(1994).
M'McClain v. Southwest Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Okla. June 25,
1996).
4 Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 889 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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interference with the right to FMLA leave on the one hand and
discrimination on the other, reflects the dual nature of the
antidiscrimination policy of the FMLA.2
B. The History and Purpose2 6 Behind the FMLA
After a long and torturous journey, including over eight
years of debate27 and two presidential vetoes,28 the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 was the first piece of legislation
signed into law by President Bill Clinton.29 The FMLA was
lauded as an overdue governmental recognition that women 0
who work outside the home need and deserve flexibility from
their employers.3' Opponents of the FMLA decried the legisla-
tion as another governmental regulation of business, destined
to slow the economy and hurt expanding small businesses.32
Congress enacted the FMILA in response to the increase in
See infra Part I.B.
26 According to one scholar, "[w]hereas the concept of legislative intent' is in
disfavor with many legal writers, that of 'legislative purpose' enjoys not only favor
but preeminence. For most, it is the touchstone of statutory interpretation." REED
DICKERsON, THE INTMRPRETATION AND APPLCATION OF STATUTES 87 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
The forerunner of the FMLA, the Parental and Disability Leave Act, was
introduced in 1985. The bill provided eighteen weeks of unpaid leave for every
two-year period for the birth or adoption or serious illness of a child, and twenty-
six weeks of unpaid leave over a twelve-month period for an employee's own seri-
ous health condition. The proposed law would have applied to employers with five
or more employees. H.R. 2020, 99th Cong. (1985).
' President George Bush vetoed the proposed Family and Medical Leave Act
passed by the 101st Congress, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1990), as well as that
passed by the 102d Congress. S. 5, 102d Cong. (1992). By the time of the
president's second veto, the Act had been altered substantially, providing that
employers with fifty or more employees grant twelve weeks of unpaid family and
medical leave to qualifying employees. Id.
" See Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 457, 459 (1995); G. John Tysse &
Kimberly L. Japinga, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act: Easily Conceived,
Difficult Birth, Enigmatic Child, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361 (1994); Donna Lenhoff
& Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Toward
the Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39 (1994).
o The FMLA applies to employees without regard to gender. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2601(a)(6), (b)(4-5) (1994).
"' See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 29, at 48; Cristina Duarte, The Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Paying the Price for an Imperfect Solution, 32 U.
LOumv E J. FAM. L. 833, 833-36 (1994).
32 See 139 CONG. REc. S1254, 1342-44 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Gorton); id. at 1254-55 (statement of Sen. Dole).
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the number of single-parent households, and the number of
two-parent households where both parents work outside the
home.' By passing the FMLA, Congress sought to address
the "demographic revolution in the composition of the
workforce" during the past forty years.' Among the findings
summarized in the Senate Report that accompanied the FMIA
was the fact that since 1950 there had been an increase of
more than two-hundred percent in the number of females
working outside the home.' Additionally, in 1988, "single par-
ents accounted for 27 percent of all family groups with children
under 18 years old," which was double that of the 1970 propor-
tion.36 Congress also was concerned with the aging American
population, and an estimate from the National Council of Ag-
ing which stated that out of 100 million American workers, 20
to 25 million "have some caregiving responsibility for an older
relative.""7 Recognizing the importance of parental participa-
tion in early childrearing and the pressures on working men
and women who must care for family members with serious
health conditions, Congress sought to balance the needs of
American families with the demands of the workplace by pro-
hibiting discrimination against employees with family respon-
sibilities." This effort is illustrated in the Act's legislative
history.
The legislative history39 is not so much ambiguous as it is
reflective of an attempt to accomplish two not altogether har-
monious goals' with one piece of legislation. Additionally,
years of compromise and concession among the bill's support-
3 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (1994).




29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1994).
"Legislative history... refers to the relevant events comprising the enact-
ment process." DICKERSON, supra note 26, at 137. Professor Dickerson, while recog-
nizing that American judges frequently and avidly look to legislative histories for
the purposes of statutory interpretation, cautions that "[aln explanatory tale should
not wag a statutory dog." DICKERSON, supra note 26, at 137.
1 The statute reveals its dual design in the first section: "It is the purpose of
this Act... to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical [and family]
reasons, . . . [and] to promote the goal of equal opportunity employment for wom-
en and men .... " 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1994). The entitlement to leave is the tool
through which the anti-discriminatory intent of the FMLA is realized.
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ers and opponents produced a law that is remarkable for its
lack of similarity to the first bill proposed.4' Though some
members of Congress saw the statute as a new minimum labor
standard,42 granting employees job protections similar to
those found in the Fair Labor Standards Act,43 the statute
was grounded in the same soil as other federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes." Similar to the federal prohibitions against em-
ployment discrimination based on race, gender, religion, dis-
ability and national origin, the new statute was conceived and
designed to protect working women from losing their jobs,
benefits and career advancements when family duties called.45
The language of the FMLA, while representing that both goals
were contemplated, favors the antidiscrimination viewpoint of
the FMLA's early proponents.
,' See generally RONALD D. ELVING, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: HOW CON-
GRESS MAKES THE LAW 42 (1995). The seeds of the FMLA were sown in reaction
to a decision of a federal district court in Southern California which held that a
1978 California statute mandating that employers provide four months of pregnan-
cy leave to their workers was unconstitutional because it was pre-empted by Title
VII and because it discriminated against men. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (March 21, 1984); see also ELVING,
supra at 18-19. The district court's opinion was later reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals because it "defie[d] common sense, misinterpret[ed] case law,
and flout[ed] Title VII and the PDA [Pregnancy Discrimination Act]." 758 F.2d
390, 393 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit's decision was upheld by the Supreme
Court. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). The
original members of the family leave coalition, disheartened and galvanized by the
decision of the district court, focused on building support for the enactment of a
federal antidiscrimination law that would guarantee that women who temporarily
left the workforce to care for newborn children would not be discriminated against
in the workplace. Creating a new federal minimum labor standard was not the
coalition's primary goal. ELVING, supra at 19, 285.
42 See 139 CONG. REC. S1254, 1344-45 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of
Sen. McCain); id. at 1345 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
43 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). The Fair Labor Standards Act, enacted in 1938,
contains, inter alia, provisions restricting child labor, setting the maximum number
of hours an employee may lawfully work, and fixing a minimum wage. See infra
Part III.
" This relationship is significant to the issue of individual liability because
courts interpreting other federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII,
have avoided imposing individual liability on supervisors or other co-workers. See
infra Part IV.B.
See 139 CONG. REC. S1254, 1355 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993) (statement of Son.
Mitchell) ("[tihis legislation is as much about giving women an equal economic
opportunity as it is about providing a national policy to protect jobs during times
of family crises.").
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For example, the language and tone of the FMLA reflect
the statute's antidiscrimination foundation."6 For example,
Congress found that "due to the nature of the roles of men and
women in our society, the primary responsibility for family
caretaldng often falls on women, and such responsibility affects
the working lives of women more than it affects the working
lives of men."'7 Further, "employment standards that apply to
one gender only have serious potential for encouraging em-
ployers to discriminate against employees and applicants for
employment who are of that gender."48 Also, Congress sought
to "accomplish the purposes [of the Act] in a manner that...
minimizes the potential for employment discrimination on the
basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available...
on a gender-neutral basis; and [ to promote the goal of equal
employment opportunity for women and men ... . 4 The con-
cern for working women, particularly those women who choose
to rear families, is apparent from the language of the Act. The
history of the FMLA also indicates that the primary goal of the
statute was to end discrimination against women who tempo-
rary left the workforce in order to bear children."' Congress
recognized the disparate impact of traditional family care ar-
rangements on women.
The FMLA had its genesis in the proposed Parental and
Disability Leave Act of 1985 ("PDLA).Y The PDLA would
have provided up to eighteen weeks of unpaid leave for moth-
ers and fathers of newborn or newly adopted children, and up
to twenty-six weeks of unpaid leave for employees' non-work-
related disabilities and for employees with sick children. The
PDLA would have applied to all businesses with five or more
' Though a comprehensive analysis of statutory interpretation is beyond the
scope of this Note, Supreme Court commentators seem to agree that the mAjority
of the current Court favors a textualist approach. See, eg., Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355
(1994); Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism. An Invita.
tion to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 750 (1995).
' 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1994).
- 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6) (1994).
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4-5) (1994).
- See ELVING, supra note 41, at 17-19.
5' ELVING, supra note 41, at 42. The PDLA was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Representative Pat Schroeder as H.R. 2020 on April 4, 1985.
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employees.52 Yet, the proposed law metamorphosed many
more times after 1985, often in response to pressures from
members of Congress and lobbyists who conditioned their sup-
port upon modifications to the bill. For example, some advo-
cates of the disabled objected to the term "disabled" in the title
of the proposed law. As a result, the bill was renamed the
Parental and Medical Leave Act. Along with the new name
came a broader base of support.3 Later compromises saw a
drastic shortening of the length of mandated leave, an exemp-
tion for businesses with fewer than fifty employees, and a
provision that would allow an employee to take protected leave
to care for a seriously ill spouse or elderly parent." To reflect
this new array of protections, the bill's sponsors eventually
changed the name of the bill to the Family and Medical Leave
Act.55
Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of the history
of the FMIA is the fact that organized labor was slow to sup-
port the bill.56 This delay emphasizes that the bill was not
conceived as a minimum labor standard, which presumably
would have had organized labor's support from the beginning.
Rather, the FMLA was perceived as an antidiscrimination
statute.57 During the four years following the introduction of
the bill, the AFL-CIO regarded family leave as "a perk for
affluent female professionals"--a group that is hardly per-
52 See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 29, at 58.
See ELVING, supra note 41, at 58.
5' ELVING, supra note 41, at 66. Each of these modifications added more inter-
est groups and more members of Congress to the FMLA support coalition. The
move to allow protected leave to care for an elderly parent caused the American
Association of Retired Persons-one of the most powerful interest groups in the
U.S.-to become one of the bill's most ardent supporters. ELVING, supra note 41,
at 66.
5' ELVING, supra note 41, at 66.
56 ELVING, supra note 41, at 153.
" During a very short period of time in the late 1980s and early 1990s Con-
gress enacted at least two other antidiscrimination statutes that directly affected
American businesses. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994), passed both houses of Congress in 1989. See ELVING, supra note 41,
at 195. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5 (1994). ELVING, supra note 41, at 195. Following passage
of these two statutes, there was little incentive for members of Congress and Pres-
ident George Bush to support yet another anti-discrimination statute that would
further burden American business. See ELVING, supra note 41, at 195-96, 292.
58 ELVING, supra note 41, at 153.
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ceived as the backbone of organized labor. The support coali-
tion, consisting mostly of feminist lawyers and liberal politi-
cians, 9 fought this perception by arguing that affluent work-
ers already enjoyed generous leave policies, and that the
protections afforded by the FIVILA would accrue mostly to
working class hourly wage earners."0 Over time, however, un-
ions became family leave proponents and activists, but they
were not easily persuaded.6'
Other interest groups also supported the family leave
legislation for their own narrow purposes. The United States
Catholic Conference, and eventually Representative Henry
Hyde, an influential member of the House, came aboard be-
cause of the prevailing feeling that legislation designed to
assist pregnant women would encourage birth and discourage
abortions.62 Interest groups such as the American Association
of University Women, the National Organization for Women,
the national Parent Teacher Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the United Methodist Church also cham-
pioned the legislation.'
Considering the broad patchwork of support and the years
of compromise behind the FMLA, the congressional intent,
behind the Act is difficult to assess. If Congress in fact intend-
ed to create a new minimum labor standard, then it may be
logical to look to interpretations of other federal labor statutes
for guidance on the issue of individual versus business entity
liability.' On the other hand, if the FMLA is more closely
" ELVING, supra note 41, at 19-31.
ELVING, supra note 41, at 154.
ELVING, supra note 41, at 154. The support of the union leaders was so slow
that it was measured in terms of "each successive Congress.&" ELVING, supra note
41, at 154. Today, however, the AFL-CIO is at the forefront of the lobbying effort
to expand the FMLA. See Laura M. Litvan, What Labor Got for Its Money,
INVESTOR'S BuSINESS DAILY, Nov. 12, 1996, at Al.
ELVING, supra note 41, at 57, 156, 290.
ELVING, supra note 41, at 32, 175-176.
' For an excellent discussion about legislative intent, its judicial usage, and its
pros and cons, see DICKERSON, supra note 26, at 67-86. But see Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) ("It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the
minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for
their votes to be both lawful and effective-but to give fair and reasonable mean-
ing to the text of the United States Code .... ") (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
See generally Dickerson, supra note 26, at 238-61.
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aligned with other federal antidiscrimination statutes, it
makes sense to look to interpretations of those statutes for
guidance. Complicating an already complex situation,6 there
is virtually no mention made in the legislative history of the
FMLA regarding the precise issue of individual versus busi-
ness entity liability. Courts interpreting the FMIA therefore
must look first to the statute itself,67 then to its implementing
regulations, and then, if necessary, to similar statutes to guide
their decisionmaking.61 The courts must not lose sight of the
fact that the FMLA was conceived as an antidiscrimination
law-not as a minimum labor standard.6 9 The problem with
taking such an approach is that the question of liability hinges
on the definition of the word "employer" in the statute, the
meaning of which, as interpreted by the Department of Labor
and the courts, is still unclear. Moreover, the word "employer"
has not been consistently defined in cases construing anti-
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA7),
nor has it been well-defined in judicial interpretations of labor
laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Family and Medical Leave Act sets up a statutory
framework and authorizes the Department of Labor to pre-
scribe regulations designed to carry out and enforce the law."0
Though the FMLA is a comparatively short statute, the subse-
quent implementing regulations promulgated by the Secretary
" See Nancy R. Daspit, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great
Idea but a 'Rube Goldberg" Solution?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1352 (1994) ("While
the Act is deceptively simple in its purposes, analysis and experience have made
it clear that interpretation and execution of the Act and regulations are anything
but simple.").
6' As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated, "[W]e do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Peter C. Schanck, An
Essay on the Role of Legislative Histories in Statutory Interpretation, 80 L. LIBR. J.
391, 394 n.14 (1988) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899)).
68 See Dickerson, supra note 25, at 238-39.
After the FMLA had been enacted by Congress and signed by President
Clinton, Judith Lichtman, head of the Women's Legal Defense Fund and a found-
ing member of the family leave coalition, stated that the idea that the FMLA was
a labor bill "annoyed [her] in the extreme. Because we believed that the women's
movement and feminists had really provided the leadership . . . for this bill ...
we didn't want [others' involvement] to obscure that." ELVING, supra note 41, at
285.
70 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994).
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of Labor consist of over a hundred pages of rules, regulations,
questions and answers.7 These regulations have been codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations, the contents of which are
required to be judicially noticed.72
The regulations pertaining to the FVLA are varied and
all-encompassing. They run the gamut from questions as sim-
ple as "What is the Family and Medical Leave Act?" 3 to dis-
cussions of the effect of the FMLA on the Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("COBRA"). 7' These
rules are designed to aid the executive branch in enforcing the
laws passed by Congress, and to help employers and employees
who come within the FILA's scope.
Regarding the issue of individual versus business entity
liability under the FMLA, the regulations explain that the
Act's definition of "employer" is similar to the definition of
"employer" in the FLSA.75 They further specify that the term
encompasses "any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 6 The
Code of Federal Regulations explains that this regulation
means that "[a]s under the FLSA, individuals such as corpo-
rate officers 'acting in the interest of an employer' are individu-
ally liable for any violations of the requirements of the
F1VIL"" This explanation, by its exclusion of other classes of
supervisory employees, indicates that supervisors who are not
"individuals such as corporate officers" should not be held
individually liable for violations of the FMLA 8 The regula-
tion not only suggests that the imposition of liability be re-
stricted to corporate officers, but also indicates that there is an
even higher threshold for liability. the requirement that the
71 See 29 C.F.R. § 825 (1997).
72 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1994).
73 29 C.F.R. § 825.100 (1997).
' 29 C.F.P Pt. 825, App. E (1997).
75 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997); see also infra Part IA.
76 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997).
' I& FLSA case law indicates that this is a high burden; it is indeed an ex-
traordinary situation when a court finds that an individual is an 'employer' under
the FISA. See infra note 139 and accompanying text
' The phrase "such as" is defined as a term meaning "for example." THE RAI-
DOm HOUSE DICTIONARY 870 (1980). Inserting this definition, the C.F.R. would
read "individuals [for example) corporate officers 'acting in the interest of an
employer' are individually liable for any violations of the... FMLA."
1997]
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corporate officers must be "acting in the interest" of the em-
ployer in order to be held liable--"employer" here meaning,
apparently, the corporate entity. 9 Furthermore, the Depart-
ment of Labor's regulation warns that, normally, only the legal
entity which employs the employee is the employer." Given
such suggestion, threshold and warning, courts should ques-
tion whether individual liability under the FMLA is appropri-
ate at all.8' Viewed objectively, the regulations are inconsis-
tent, and thus ambiguous.
II. THE DEFINITION OF "EMPLOYER" UNDER THE FMLA
A. Statutory Interpretation
The Family and Medical Leave Act prohibits any employer
from interfering with the exercise of any right granted by the
Act, 2 and from discriminating against an employee who has
exercised his or her right to protected leave." The Act holds
the employer liable for damages arising out of the employer's
violation of the FMLA." Liability for violations of the Act is
thus dependent upon who is an "employer," a term that must
" This additional restriction, though of vital importance to the liability provi-
sions of the FMLA, is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is essential to
recognize that the Code of Federal Regulations imposes not only a positional re-
quirement for liability-that the person be an individual such as a corporate offi-
cer-but also a behavioral requirement-that the person must have been acting in
the interest of the employer. Of course, the "employer" in this sense must mean
the business entity lest the regulation be rendered meaningless. This definitional
difficulty could be avoided simply by holding the corporate entity solely liable for
FMIA violations. See infra Part H..
80 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c) (1997).
81 Judicial skepticism on this point is warranted not only because of the cir-
cular definition of "employer" in the FMLA and its regulations, but also because of
the distinctions between the Fair Labor Standards Act and the FMLA. See infra
Part III.
82 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994).
- 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (1994).
84 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (1994). This section is somewhat confusing, however,
because section 2615(b) prohibits any person from discriminating against an em-
ployee who exercises his or her FMLA rights. The use of the word "person" in this
section seems to indicate a natural-not corporate-person. In distinction, section
2615(a) prohibits the employer from taking certain actions which may violate the
statute. Section 2617(a)(1), however, pins liability solely on the employer. Because
of these distinctions, it seems appropriate to conclude that section 2617(a)(1) holds
the employer liable-not the natural "person" referred to in section 2615(b).
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be given the same meaning throughout the statute.'
While defining a common term such as employer may
seem like an easy task, the FMLA provides a rather convoluted
definition. The Act defines "employer" as:
any person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting com-
merce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day
during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or
preceding calendar year;, includ[ing] any person who acts, directly or
indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of
such employer ....
This definition appears to codify the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior by including "person" within the scope of
"employer."8 7 This interpretation is logical since the granting
of FMLA leave or discrimination against an employee who
takes FMLA leave will always be within the scope of an indi-
vidual "person's" official duties. The term "employer" logically
includes people working for the employer and under its direc-
tion.
Nevertheless, because the statutory definition is subject to
varying interpretations,s the Code of Federal Regulations at-
See Dickerson, supra note 26, at 219, 224-24, 229, 233.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)i), (ii) (1994).
Respondeat superior literally means []et the master answer." BLACKCS LAW
DICTIoNARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990). According to Black's Law Dictionary, this doctrine
"means that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his ser-
vant, and a principal for those of his agent .... Under this doctrine master is
responsible for want of care on servants part toward those to whom master owes
duty to use care ... ." Id. at 1311-12.
Such definitional difficulty is not confined to the FMLA. Justice Souter com-
mented on the difficulty of construing the meaning of the term "employee" where
a statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ('ERISA), did not ade-
quately define the term. "ERISA's nominal definition of 'employee' as 'any individu-
al employed by an employee ... is completely circular and explains nothing.'
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992). The definition of
"employer" in the FMLA is similarly circular. The word 'person" in the FMA has
the same meaning as the FLSA's definition of "person" in 29 U.S.C. § 203(a): 'an
individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative,
or any organized group of persons." The FMLAf's definition of "employer' is ren-
dered practically worthless because it uses the term it purports to define as part
of the definition, and because the word "person" has at least seven different mean-
ings. Absurdities result if the definition is taken literally. The Department of
Labor's subsequent attempt to explain the term is an implicit recognition that the
statute's definition is unworkable. Moreover, that the word 'person" in the FMLA
has the same meaning as the word "person" in the FLSA is significant because
the FLSA clearly distinguishes between 'persons" and 'employers." See infra Part
1997] 1313
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tempts to simplify the definition by acknowledging that
"[n]ormally the legal entity which employs the employee is the
employer under FMLA." 9 However, the attempt at simplifica-
tion is in vain, because the regulations further specify that
[ain 'employer' includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer to any of the employer's employees. The
definition of 'employer' in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 203(d), similarly includes any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee. As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers,
'acting in the interest of an employer' are individually liable for any
violations of the requirements of FMLA.'
In the end, there is no easy way to analyze the definition of
"employer" in the FMLA. And harmonizing the different defini-
tions of "employer" is an even greater task.
First, the language of the statute's definition of employer
is confusing." Instead of providing a basic definition for the
term, the statute attempts to provide an explanation of the
term. Moreover, the purported definition uses in its text the
very term which it is supposed to define, providing a classic
example of circularity.92 Read literally, the statute says that
an employer is any individual, partnership, association, corpo-
ration, business trust, legal representative, or any organized
III.
29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c) (1997).
0 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997). This is the only mention of individual liability
in the FMLA and its regulations. While a court will give "considerable weight ...
to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer," the court is not required to absolutely accept that interpretation.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984). Chevron set forth a two-part analysis for courts to follow when review-
ing an agency's construction of a statute: first is "the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id at 842. If Congressional
intent is clear, the court must give effect to the "unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress." I& at 842-43. However, if Congress has not spoken to the precise
issue in controversy, the court must determine "whether the agency's (interpreta-
tion] is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. As pointed
out in Part I.B., supra, Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question of
individual liability under the FMLA. Moreover, given the confusing statutory defi-
nition of "employer" in the FMLA, the Department of Labor's conclusion that indi-
viduals may be liable for violations of the statute cannot be a permissible con-
struction of the FMLA. The regulations thus fail the second prong of the Chevron
analyis.
91 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
9 See id. and supra note 86.
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group of persons, who acts directly or indirectly in the interest
of any individual, partnership, association, corporation, busi-
ness trust, legal representative, or any organized group of
persons who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any
individual, partnership... and so forth in a vicious circle of
definitional dementia.3 Had Congress really intended for in-
dividuals other than sole proprietors to be considered statutory
employers under the FMLA, the law could have accomplished
this purpose through other language. For example, the statute
could have stated outright that individual supervisors are
liable for FMLA violations, or it could have clearly distin-
guished between natural and corporate persons, or it could
have distinguished, as does the FLSA, between "person" and
"employer.' Either of these options would have simplified
the analysis, because Congress would have "directly spoken to
the precise question at issue."5
However, the statute and the Department of Labor's im-
plementing regulations obfuscate what should be a simple
issue." The statute indicates that persons who act in the in-
terest of an employer are to be considered employers.' On the
other hand, the implementing regulations state that normally
only the legal entity which employs an employee is an employ-
er.9" This latter approach seems to make the most sense. Con-
fining liability to the legal entity which employs' an employ-
' This should not be interpreted to mean that a sole proprietor who otherwise
meets the definition of 'employer" would not be liable for FMLA violations. See
supra note 14.
See infra Part M.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US.
837, 842.
Compare the simple definition of *employer in Black's Law Dictionary:
"[o]ne who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who
pays their wages or salaries." BLACK'S LAW11 DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990). The
Senate Report accompanying the FMLA states that the term "emplof means
"maintain on the payroll." S. Rep. 103-3, 22 (1993), quoted in Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Local Union 786, 107 F.3d 1052, 1065 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997).
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii){I) (1994). This definition, however, ignore3 the
economic realities of the modem workplace. See infra Part 1V.B.
9" 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(c) (1997). This explanation conforms well with the term's
common definition.
The term 'employ" in the FMLA means "to suffer or permit to work," the
same definition used in the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U..C. §§ 2611(3),
203(g) (1994). This language is derived from child labor statutes, and is broadly
construed, see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (cit-
1997]
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ee assures that a remedy is available' 0 and provides a poten-
tial plaintiff with no doubt about whom to sue.'' However,
the regulations proceed to state that even though natural per-
sons usually are not employers, persons such as corporate
officers acting in the interest of an employer are themselves
employers.0 2 Thus, a synthesis of the statute with its regula-
tions may be impossible.
Another major reason for the difficulty of such an analysis
is the internal inconsistency of the statute itself. A quick look
at other sections of the statute shows that the confusion ex-
tends beyond the definitional conundrum previously described.
For example, the FMLA requires that employers maintain an
employee's health benefits during any period of FMLA
leave,0 3 and that should an employee fail to return from
leave, the employer may recover the premium which was paid
to continue the employee's coverage during the leave."' In
this section of the statute, the employer is obviously the entity
which employs the employee. It is difficult to believe that an
individual supervisor, or even a corporate officer, is personally
responsible for maintaining and paying the premium for an
employee's health benefits during the employee's leave. It is
just as unbelievable that a supervisor would sue-or have
standing to sue-an employee to recover the premium paid on
the employee's behalf should the employee fail to return to
work following FMLA leave. Such a suit would certainly be
brought by the legal entity that employs the employee. It sim-
ply is not logical to assume that in this section of the Act Con-
gress intended "employer" to mean an individual supervisor.
ing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 (1947)).
"® Remedies for violation of the FMLA are limited to the dollar amount actu-
ally lost or any actual monetary loss suffered by the employee as a direct result
of the violation, plus liquidated damages equal to the amount lost if the violation
was willful. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A) (1994). Equitable remedies such as reinstate-
ment or promotion are also available. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (1994).
10 But for the employment relationship, there can be no violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act. The legal employing entity logically should answer for
violations of the Act. See infra Part IV.A.
12 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (1994).
10, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(2) (1994).
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Two other examples support the proposition that because
the use of the term "employer" is not internally consistent, an
individual supervisor cannot be considered an employer. In one
of its more simple sections, the FMLA mandates that employ-
ers post and maintain a notice in the workplace informing
employees of their rights under the FMLA."I A willful viola-
tion of this section subjects the employer to a fine of up to one
hundred dollars. 6 Just as in the previous example, the duty
to post the FMILA notice surely falls upon the legal entity that
employs the employee, and not upon an individual supervisor.
Finally, the FMLA provides that an employee wishing to take
FMLA leave in order to attend to a serious medical condition
provide a satisfactory medical certification to the employer."
If the employer has any reason to doubt the veracity of the
employee's medical certification, the employer may, at its own
expense, request a second opinion, and if necessary, a
third.' In such a situation, it is implausible to expect that
Congress intended a supervisor to pay the costs of obtaining a
second and third opinion regarding an employee's medical
certification. Certainly the costs are to be borne by the legal
entity which employs the employee. In sum, the use of the
term "employer" in the FMLA is consistent with only one inter-
pretation: that the employer under the Act is the legal entity
that employs the employee-the entity for whom employees
work and who pays their wages and salaries."'
Adding to the difficulty of defining employer is the fact
that several of the district courts which have analyzed the
FMLA have relied exclusively on the Fair Labor Standards
Act" for guidance in interpreting the FMA"' Because
10 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1994).
10 29 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (1994).
'0 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1994).
103 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c-d) (1994).
1 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
11 Under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), '[eimployer' includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994). The FL5A's federal regulations note
that the term "employer" includes aany person acting directly or indirectly as an
employer or as an agent of an employer in relation to an employee... . 29
C.F.R. § 401.5 (1997). This regulations explanation of the term "employer' is very
similar to the definition of employer found in Title VII, which defines "employer"
in relevant part as 'a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C.
1997] 1317
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the definition of "employer" in the FMLA parallels the defini-
tion found in the FLSA, the district courts that have addressed
the issue of individual liability under the FMLA have inter-
preted the statute by hijacking and haphazardly applying the
reasoning from cases construing the FLSA.112 While a com-
parison with the FLSA is understandable due to the fact that
both Acts protect employees in the workplace, the FMLA's
history and provisions set it apart from the FLSA. This distinc-
tion should be taken into account when interpreting the stat-
ute. Moreover, the fact that the two statutes use similar lan-
guage to define "employer" would not come as a surprise to any
statutory scholar; the courts, however, upon recognizing this
similar language, purport to finish the statutory analysis be-
fore it ever actually begins. The courts have improperly per-
ceived the FMLA as a minimum labor standard instead of its
more appropriate characterization as an antidiscrimination
statute."' In doing so, the courts have ignored the FMLA's
history and purpose,"' and have interpreted the statute
piecemeal rather than as a whole.
§ 20OO0e-(b) (1994). At least four circuit courts of appeals have held that this defi-
nition precludes a finding of individual liability under Title VII. See Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir.
1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991).
... While the language of the FMLA itself does not suggest that courts look to
the Fair Labor Standards Act to provide any guidance as to its interpretation, the
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2654
are replete with comparisons of the FMLA to the FLSA and other federal labor
statutes such as the Labor Management Relations Act. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R.
§§ 825.104-105; 825.108 & 110 (1997). Such comparisons admittedly are difficult
for a court to resist when interpreting the FMLA.
1 See, e.g., Mciernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., Civ.-.No. 95-1175, 1995
WL 311393, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp. 326,
330-31 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659, 663-64 (D. Md.
1996).
3 See infra Part N..A.
1 See McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3; Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. Supp.
326, at 330-31; Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. at 663-64.
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B. Case Law
1. Freemon v. Foley
One of the first cases that confronted the issue of individu-
al versus corporate entity liability under the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act was Freemon v. Foley," where the district
court considered the issue as one of first impression in the
Seventh Circuit.'16 Jimmye Freemon was employed as a nu-
tritionist at Mount Sinai Hospital in Chicago."' One morning
before work Freemon discovered that her five-year old son had
chicken pox."' She notified her supervisor, Gilda Ivy, of her
son's ailment on the next business day." Two days later,
Freemon learned that her three-year old son had a contagious
fungal infection.2" The doctor ordered Freemon to keep both
children at home until they recovered.' Freemon reported
the new development to Ivy, and asked for time off work to
care for her kids." Ivy told Freemon that her vacation time
would cover a two-week leave of absence, but that she must
return to work when her vacation time depleted.'
"However, by the time her youngest son had recovered from
his fungal infection, he had caught his older brother's chicken
pox.' Three days after her vacation time had expired,
Freemon informed Ivy and Steve Foley, Ivy's supervisor, of the
new developments, and that she would be back at work after
another week at home.' After returning to work, Freemon
allegedly failed to document her lengthy absence' to the sat-
115 911 F. Supp. 326 (1995).
11 Id. at 330.
117 Id. at 328. Freemon was on probation during the events leading up to her
dismissal. I&
11 Id. at 328.
119 I&





Freemon, 911 F.Supp. at 328.
Id. at 328-29. The FIALA allows employers to require employees taking leave
to submit a medical certification issued by the health care provider, documenting
the condition of the sick individual, whether it be the employee or the employee's
spouse, child, or parent. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1994). Medical certification is not
1997J
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isfaction of Steven Huish, the Vice-President of Human Re-
sources. 127 Three weeks after Freemon returned to work,
Foley contacted her at home and notified her that she had
been discharged for failing to document her absences. 128
Freemon brought her cause of action against Mount Sinai, Ivy,
Foley, and Huish.
129
Ivy, Foley and Huish moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that they were not "employers" under the FMLA, and
thus could not be held personally liable for a violation of the
FMLA."' The individual defendants argued that they did not
employ fifty or more people during the previous twenty
weeks,'3 ' they were not officers or directors of Mount Sinai,
and they each lacked unilateral authority to hire, fire or grant
a leave of absence to any employee. 3 2
The Freemon court quoted the statutory definition of "em-
ployer," but did not conduct an independent inquiry into the
term's meaning. Instead, the court chose to conduct the analy-
sis by looking to other federal statutes. 3 The court noted
that the definition of "employer" in the FMLA3 differed from
that in Title VII, the ADA, and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"). 135 For that reason, the court de-
needed if the employee is taking FMLA leave because of the birth, adoption, or
foster care placement of a child. Id.
Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 326, 329.
10Id.
's Id. at 328. The suit also named Juan Corbin, who had been Freemon's tem-
porary acting supervisor the day Freemon returned to work, as a defendant. Id.
'30 Id. at 330.
131 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994).
132 Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330.
13 Id. This fact is significant because Freemon was clearly alleging retaliatory
discrimination: that she had been terminated because she took FMLA protected
leave. The court noted that the issue of individual liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994)), the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)) and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") (29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994))
had been litigated frequently in the district, and that the Seventh Circuit had
recently rejected individual liability under the ADA. 911 F. Supp. 326, 330 (citing
EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-82 (7th Cir. 1995)).
134 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
13 These anti-discrimination statutes define "employer" as a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce "and any agent of such person. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (1994) [ADA]; § 2000e(b) (1994) [Title VIII; 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994)
[ADEAJ. The inclusion of the word "agent" in these definitions has caused several
courts to find that individuals may not be held personally liable for statutory
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clined to extend the reasoning of the cases interpreting these
anti-discrimination statutes to the FMLA claims. ' Then, in
lieu of conducting an inquiry into what the term "employer'
means in the FMLA, the court simply took notice of the "paral-
lel" between the definitional language in the FLSA and the
FMLA, and decided to rely upon the FLSA line of cases to "en-
lighten [its] interpretation" of the issue of individual liabili-
ty.137
Remarkably, the court pointed out that the Code of Feder-
al Regulations indicated that the definitions of "employer" in
the FMLNA and FLSA were the same, but failed to analyze the
regulations. 8 Instead, the court proceeded to examine a line
of cases interpreting the FLSA. 5 9
violations. Instead, the acts of supervisors are imputed to the employer under com-
mon law agency principles. See Tomka v. The Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d
Cir. 1995); Mliller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also supra note 98 and accompanying text. Significantly, the procedures and reme-
dies provided by Congress under the ADEA were originally the same as tho3e
under the FLSA. MARK A. ROTH5TEIN, ET AL., EPLOYMEiNT LAW § 3.37, at 297
(1994). However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the procedures of the
ADEA so that they are now almost identical to those under Title VII. Id. at 298.
Freemen, 911 F. Supp. at 330.
Freemon, 911 F. Supp. 326, 330-32. The court also cited to two FMLA cases
from other jurisdictions in which the courts had addressed the issue of individual
liability, Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., No. Ls94-CV-525, 1995 WL 478884,
at *5-6 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 1995), and McMernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3. In
Midwest Plastic, the district court addressed the question whether an individual
who is an owner, officer and director of a company was an 'employee under the
FMLA. Midwest Plastic, 1995 WL 478884, at *6. The court looked to cases inter-
preting the FLSA for guidance and purported to apply an 'economic reality' test
in determining whether the individual defendant could be personally liable for
violation of the Act. Id. While the court explained that the individual defendant
oversaw the day to day operation of the company, it did not offer any justification
for its holding; there was nothing to indicate that the individual defendant had af-
fected the plaintiffs ability to take FMLA-protected leave and nothing to show
that he had participated at all in the events that led to the filing of a lawsuit. In
other words, the court found that the individual was an "employer' simply because
of his position in the company-not for any act (overt or covert) that harmed the
employee/plaintiff. Id. The individual did not actually do anything; he merely cccu-
pied a position of authority. See also supra note 70 and accompanying text. It
should also be noted that when the case proceeded to trial the court found that
the defendants did not violate the FULA, and the plaintiff took nothing. The indi-
vidual defendant, whom the court had earlier found to be an 'employer under the
FAILA, was not even identified in the court's opinion. Reich v. Midwest Plastic
Eng'g, Inc., 1995 WL 514851, at *3 (W.D. Mfich. July 26, 1995).
See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
Among the FLSA cases cited by the court were Dole u. Elliott Travel &
Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991) (for the propo3ition that the FLSA
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contemplates simultaneous employers); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 695
(7th Cir. 1987) (stating in dicta that an individual may be liable for FLSA viola-
tions if that person has supervisory authority over the complainant and was re-
sponsible in whole or in part for the alleged violation). The Freemon court also
cited a Fifth Circuit case for the principle that FLSA liability "extend[s] to those
'who, though lacking a possessory interest in the 'employer' corporation, effectively
dominatel its administration or otherwise act[], or ha[ve] the power to act, on
behalf of the corporation vis-a-vis its employees.' " Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 331,
citing Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (quotations
omitted).
However, none of these cases support the Freemon court's decision that the
individual defendants were "employers" under the FMLA. First, all of these cases
dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act, not the FMLA. See infra Part III. The
court in Elliott Travel & Tours found that an individual who was the president
and joint owner of Elliott Travel was an "employer" under the FLSA and could be
held personally liable for violations of the statute's overtime wages and
recordkeeping requirements. Elliott Travel & Tours, 942 F.2d at 964. The court
noted that the "FLSA contemplates there being several simultaneous employers
who may be responsible for compliance with the FLSA." Id. at 965 (citing Falk v.
Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973)). Falk, however, offers little strength for that
claim. Instead, Falk held that an apartment complex management partnership
consisting of two people was an "employer" under the FLSA because it had "sub-
stantial control of the terms and conditions of the work" of the employees who
maintained the apartments. Falk, 414 U.S. at 195. Only one of the partners was
sued in his individual capacity. Id. at 190. The Court held "that D & F is, . . . an
'employer' " under the FLSA. Id. at 195. The Court used the singular "is" and
referred only to the partnership entity itself in its holding. Id. There is no indica-
tion at all that the Court held that Drucker and Falk individually were employers
under the FLSA, and thus individually liable for D & F's violations. Falk neither
approved nor suggested the proposition that the individual petitioners were "em-
ployers" and thus potentially liable for violations of the FLSA. But even if the
Court had, in fact, held that the two partners individually were statutory "employ-
ers," it is axiomatic that a partner in a general partnership is individually liable
for the obligations of the partnership. Courts uniformly have misstated and misin-
terpreted the Court's holding in Falk, with the result that courts importing FLSA
case law into FMLA cases have erroneously assumed that the Supreme Court has
held that individuals can be deemed "employers" and thus be personally liable for
FLSA violations.
Elliott Travel & Tours also relied upon Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509 (1st
Cir. 1983), to support its assertion that an individual may be personally liable for
violations of the FLSA. However, the Agnew test is inapposite to the defendants
both in Elliott Travel and in Freemon. The multi-factor test states that corporate
officers with a significant ownership interest who had operational control of signifi-
cant aspects of the corporation's day to day functions, including compensation of
employees, and who personally made decisions to continue operations despite fi-
nancial adversity during the period of non-payment" of wages were employers
under the FLSA. Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1514. Under such a strict test, the only
individual who could possibly meet the requirements would be a person who is an
owner, officer, general manager and main decisionmaker in a company. None of
the individual defendants in Freemon met these requirements. In short, Elliott
Travel & Tours provides no foundation for a finding that the individual defendants
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The court noted that "Is]tatus as an employer under the
FLSA is a question of law."4' The court conducted a factual
inquiry of the circumstances under which an individual could
be considered an "employer,"' using a "control test." Fol-
lowing the reasoning of the FLSA cases that it examined, the
court found that "because of the expansive interpretation given
to the term 'employer' in the FLSA," liability under the FMLA
would extend "to all those who controlled 'in whole or in part'
Freemon's ability to take a leave of absence and return to her
in Freemon were "employers" under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Further, Riordan v. Kempiners, an action brought under the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994), an amendment to the FLSA, was essentially a
sex discrimination case with the E.P.A. claim tacked on. Riordan v. Kempiners,
831 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1987). At oral argument, the plaintiff asserted that
she was suing Kempiners in his official-not individual-capacity. Id. at 694-95.
Because there was no assertion of personal liability, Riordan has nothing to do
with individual liability under the FLSA nor the FMLA.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Circle C Investments merely relied upon two of
its own previous decisions to support its holding that Charles Cranford, a "consul-
tant" to a company which operated a group of nightclubs, was an "employer" un-
der the FLSA. Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (1993). Circle C
was a company which was owned by Cranford's wife. Id. at 326. Moreover, the
court found that the employees of the company (topless dancers) thought that
Charles Cranford owned the nightclubs. Id. at 329 n.4. Cranford hired the dancers,
instructed the employees, signed paychecks, removed money from the company's
safes, and forced dancers to dance to his favorite songs. Id. at 329. There is little
question that there really was no separate identity between the company and its
"consultant." Circle C Investments should be read simply as holding that in an
insular situation, where there is no separate identity between the individual and
the company, the person who exercises such unbridled power may be considered
an "employer" under the FLSA. In a situation such as Circle C Investments, it
makes little practical difference that both the individual and the company were
deemed 'employers," because they are one and the same.
1"0 Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 331 (citing Karr v. Strong Detective Agency, Inc.,
787 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir. 1985)). Other courts have treated this issue as a
question of fact. See, e.g., Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1995),
affd 91 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1996); Donovan v. American Leader Newspapers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Fla 1981); Wintz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668
(5th Cir. 1968).
. Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 331. It is not always obvious if a court is making
a legal or a factual decision regarding the definition of the term 'employer." See
Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709 (1986) (holding that the defini-
tion of the term "seaman" in the Fair Labor Standards Act was a factual-not a
legal-finding). Icicle Seafoods may not only be important in determining the stan-
dard of appellate review of a decision involving the definition of "employer" under
the FMLA, but also in determining whether the question ultimately should be




The court concluded that Ivy, Huish and Foley "exercised
sufficient control over [Freemon's] ability to take protected
leave to qualify as employers under the FMLA."113 In so hold-
ing, the court not only refused to interpret the FMLA on its
own terms, but also failed to consider the FMLA's implement-
ing regulations. The court denied the motions of the individual
defendants with the exception of Corbin.'"
The Freemon decision highlights both the inadequacy of
the statutory definition of "employer," and the tendency of the
FMLA's implementing regulations to divert a court's analysis
of the statute from independent investigation to an oversimpli-
fied examination of FLSA case law.
2. McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co.
A similar error was made by the court in McKiernan v.
Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co.4 ' And again, the unsound result
could have been avoided had the court simply conducted an
independent analysis of the FMLA, or merely taken into ac-
count the entire language of the Code of Federal
Regulations.'46
After working for Smith-Edwards-Dunlap for more than
five years as a driver/messenger, McKiernan requested a nine-
ty-day unpaid leave of absence to care for his wife and fami-
ly.141 McKiernan's wife was pregnant and undergoing serious
pregnancy-related health problems.'48  After ninety days,
McKiernan requested and was granted an extension of his
unpaid leave of absence. The company's personnel director
allegedly told McKiernan to do whatever he needed to do in
order to care for his wife and family.5 ' McKiernan and his
12 Id. at 332.
1 Id. at 331.
14 Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 332. Corbin could not be held individually liable
because his involvement in the events was limited to delivering Freemen's medical
documentation to Ivy after she returned to work. Id. The line-drawing around the
decision regarding Corbin was not explained in detail by the court.
14 No. Civ.A.95-1175, 1995 WL 311393 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995).
14 See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
'47 McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *2.
148 Id.
149 Id.
1' McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., No. Civ.A.95-1175, 1995 WL
1324 [Vol. 63: 1299
THE FAMILYAND MEDICAL LFAVE ACT OF 1993
employer also agreed that the company would stop paying for
his medical insurance. 5'
Later, McKiernan's wife gave birth but remained in inten-
sive care for two and a half months."2 Smith-Edwards even-
tually tried to contact McKiernan about his job.' Two weeks
after McKiernan was supposed to return to work, he was ter-
minated by a letter from Robert Jardel, his production manag-
er.'M McKiernan's lawsuit followed, naming both Smith-Ed-
wards and Jardel as defendants.1M
Jardel moved for summary judgment on the basis that he
was not an "employer" under the FMLA." 6 The court took
notice that under the Code of Federal Regulations, "individu-
als... 'acting in the interest of an employer' are individually
liable for any violations of the requirements of the statute.""
However, while quoting the very regulation which suggests
that FMLA liability be limited to corporate officers who act in
the interest of an employer, the court inserted ellipses into the
opinion in place of the words "such as corporate officers."
=
After this omission, 9 the court went on to hold that persons
311393 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995).
151 Id. Under the provisions of the FMLA, the employer is required to continue
an employee's medical insurance coverage during the period of the unpaid leave.
29 U.S.C. § 2614(c) (1994).
11 Mcffiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *2.
153 Id
'm'id.
1"5 McKiernan, like the plaintiff in Freemon dearly alleged retaliatory discrimi-
nation: that he had been terminated because he took family and medical leave.
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
McKlernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3.
" Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d)).
SMcMernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3.
... The court's oversight is startling. In addition to omitting a vital part of the
regulation, the court also failed to follow commonly accepted rules of statutory
interpretation and application. "If the language of the statute is plain and free
from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that mean-
ing is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to
convey? HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND IN'=-
PRETATION OF THE LAWS, 35-6 (1896). It matters not that this language is found in
the Code of Federal Regulations and not in the statute itself, because Congress
expressly mandated that the Secretary of Labor promulgate a series of regulations
in order to implement the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (1994). Moreover, even if the
court were to have found the language of the C.F.R. ambiguous, "the court is not
at liberty, merely because it had a choice between two constructions, to substitute
for the will of the legislature its own ideas as to the justice, expediency, or policy
of the law." BLACK, supra, at 36.
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who have the ability to hire and fire may be considered em-
ployers-a slight modification of the Freemon court's "control
test."6 ' As a result, the court's reasoning was based solely on
past interpretations of the definition' of "employer" in the
FLSA. 6 2 Thus, the court refused to grant summary judgment
to Jardel, preferring instead to "await further development of
the facts" before determining whether Jardel was an employer
under the FMLA.
16 3
In reality, the McKiernan court had no need to postpone
the question of Jardel's status as an employer under the
FMLA. Under neither the statute nor the Code of Federal
Regulations did Jardel qualify as McKiernan's employer, de-
spite Jardel's position as McKiernan's immediate manager, 16
and his signature on the letter discharging McKiernan."'
Had the court independently analyzed the term "employer" as
used in the FMIA, or even simply applied the Department of
Labor's implementing regulations in their entirety, it would
have been better able to analyze Jardel's supervisory sta-
tus. '6 Despite the circular and contradictory language in the
FMLA, there is still little room for a finding that Jardel was a
statutory "employer," nor an individual "such as a corporate
officer who 'act[ed] in the interest of an employer.'" 167
McKiernan is another example of the confusion surrounding
the question of supervisory liability.
1" McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3.
... 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994).
162 McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *3.
" Id. The court offered no indication about what further facts it would need to
determine whether Jardel could be considered McKiernan's "employer." Further, by
choosing to await further discovery before deciding whether Jardel was an "em-
ployer" under the FMLA, the court treated the issue as a question of fact, not as
a question of law. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
6 McKiernan, 1995 WL 311393, at *1. That Jardel was a low-level supervisory
employee is apparent from the fact that Smith-Edwards' human resources manager
submitted an affidavit to the court on behalf of the company, which supported the
defendants' summary judgment motion. Id. at *2. The affidavit also detailed the
history of its communications with McKiernan. Id.
1' Id. at * 3. It is not clear from the court's opinion if Jardel was ordered by
the human resources manager to write the letter.
'64 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997).
1 Id. Even under the other tests available for a determination of status as an
"employer" under the FLSA, Jardel does not qualify as McKiernan's employer. See
supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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3. Knussman v. Maryland
Similar confusion regarding status as an "employer" under
the FMLA was encountered by the court in Knussman v. Mary-
land." The plaintiff Howard Knussman, was an officer with
the Maryland State Police." Knussman's suit claimed that
he was "deprived of his right to parental leave immediately fol-
lowing the birth of his daughter expressly because of his gen-
der." '7 Knussman named the State of Maryland, the Mary-
land State Police, Colonel David B. Mitchell, Captain David
Czorapinski, First Sergeant Ronnie P. Creel, and Jill D.
Mullineaux as defendants.' The individual defendants
moved to dismiss Knussman's FILA claims against them,
arguing that "by definition it is an official act that subjects
individuals to liability; therefore, suits against individuals in
their individual capacities are inappropriate."' The individ-
ual defendants made a persuasive respondeat superior argu-
ment-that they were merely agents of the real employer, the
State of Maryland, and that liability should flow through them
to their principal.' They argued that but for the existence of
their employer, the State of Maryland, there was no relation-
ship at all between Knussman and the individual defen-
dants. 74
In response, the court quoted the FMLks definition of
employer, 175  and then looked to Freemon176  and
McKiernan for guidance. Finding the "rationale of the
Freemon court persuasive," the court held that "liability under
the FMLA is essentially the same as liability under the
161 935 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1996).
16 Id at 662.
170 Id In addition to his FULA claim, Kiussman alleged violations of the 14th
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment.
Id Similar to the plaintiffs in Freemon v. Foley and McKernan u. Smith-Edwards-
Dunlap, Knussman was alleging discrimination.
Id at 661.
172 Id at 664.
123 See infra Part 1V.B.
17 See infra Part 1V.B.
171 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(l) (1994). See also supra Part H.A.
1 See supra notes 115-39, and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 140-62 and accompanying text.
1 Knussman, 935 F. Supp. at 664.
1997] 1327
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
FLSA."'79 The next portion of the court's analysis is trou-
bling. Turning to the FMLA's implementing regulations, the
court quoted the Code of Federal Regulations in the exact
manner as it was quoted in the McKiernan decision, leaving
out the phrase "such as corporate officers." 8 ' Again, the court
placed ellipses in the opinion in place of perhaps the most
relevant words in the entire regulation."8 ' One wonders
whether the court even looked at the regulation, or if it merely
copied it verbatim from McKiernan. One also wonders which
scenario is worse.
With this "hard step" now out of the way, the court was
free to appropriate the reasoning of cases interpreting the
FLSA and apply it haphazardly to the case before it.'82 The
court then held that the "liability of individual defendants in
their individual capacities is not foreclosed under the
FMLA."' Like Freemon and McKiernan before, the
Knussman court failed to read the FMLA as a whole, glanced
too quickly at the Department of Labor's regulations, and did
not consider the significant analytical problems inherent in
importing FLSA case law into FMIA interpretation.
The Knussman court's analysis highlights the ease with
which courts rely upon imprecise analyses promulgated by
other courts that have been confronted with similar issues.
After the first decision is made, little if any attention is paid to
the steps taken by the first court. While the facts of Freemon,
McKiernan and Knussman are admittedly similar, the parallel
reasoning behind the courts' decisions is open to debate. At the
very least, the courts could have discussed the confusing statu-
tory definition of "employer," and admitted the difficulty of the
analysis. Moreover, overlooking the definition and elaboration
of the term "employer" in the Code of Federal Regulations,
when the court is required to take judicial notice of the regula-
tions,"'4 constitutes a serious lapse of judgment. That it was
committed by three separate district courts makes the issue
79 Id.
180 Id.
.. That the identical error was committed by two separate district courts
should raise an eyebrow.
" Knussman, 935 F. Supp. 659.
183 Id. at 664.
184 See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1994).
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more distressing. Finally, the three courts' careless importation
of FLSA case law into FM.A terrain does not do justice to the
authors of the statute, to the businesses and employees affect-
ed by the statute, nor to the helpless supervisors caught in a
web of litigation for simply following corporate policy.
The reality is that the statute and its implementing regu-
lations provide little support for the proposition that an indi-
vidual supervisor can be considered an employer under the
Family and Medical Leave Act.s Without this needed sup-
port, individuals such as the defendants in Freemon,
McKiernan and Knussman should not be deemed "employers"
under the FMLA, and should not be held personally liable for
its violation.
4. Summary
The fact that three federal district courts sitting in differ-
ent jurisdictions followed almost identical paths in deciding the
question of individual liability under the Family and Medical
Leave Act admittedly may be a simple case of mistaken reli-
ance on the decision of another court. While reliance on anoth-
er court's decision may simplify the job of the jurist, a previ-
ously decided case has inherent limitations.es "The decided
case... establish[es] a principle, and it is indeed a... begin-
ning.... [but a] principle is a fundamental assumption that
does not foreclose further inquiry."1" Additionally, the princi-
ples set forth in the cases constituted mere persuasive authori-
ty for other courts faced with similar questions. Thus, because
previous decisions of these district courts are not binding on
any other court, judges who address the question of individual
liability under the FMLA in the future have a duty to indepen-
dently analyze the question." The definition of "employer" in
iS See supra Part II-.A
Honorable Edward D. Re, Stare Decisis, Address Before Federal Appellate
Judges (May 13-16, 1975), in EDUCATION AND TRAINING SERIES 3 (Federal Judicial
Center).
19 Id.
" "[Wihere it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood or misap-
plied, or where the former determination is ... contrary to reason[] [tihe authori-
ties are abundant to show that in such cases it is the duty of the courts to reex-




the FMLA must be given uniform meaning throughout the
statute.'89 A court may not pick and choose when "employer"
means the business entity and when it means individual su-
pervisors. When read as a whole, it is clear that though the
term "employer" "includ[es] any person... act[ing] ... in the
interest of an employer," this definition plainly incorporates
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. 9 ' Because
the employer only acts through its employees, the liability
flows through those employees back to the business entity.
Moreover, the federal regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor do not adequately support the imposition of
such individual liability. Simply put, the Department of
Labor's regulations are not a permissible construction of the
ambiguous term of the statute, thus running afoul of the sec-
ond prong of the Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. analysis. As a result, courts are under no
obligation to defer to the Department's interpretation. Howev-
er, even if individual supervisors are considered "employers"
under the FMLA, and individual liability were appropriate in a
given case,' 9' liability still would be limited to persons meet-
ing the high threshold set by the regulations: that the individ-
uals be persons "such as" corporate officers acting in the inter-
est of the employer.'92
Finally, the crux of the problem with these decisions is
that the courts, prodded by language in the regulations,
thoughtlessly looked to case law interpreting the Fair Labor
Standards Act for interpretational guidance when deciding the
issue of individual liability under the FMLA. The Fair Labor
Standards Act is not the proper prism through which to inter-
pret the Family and Medical Leave Act. Moreover, the entire
premise for individual liability under the FLSA is based upon
a single case that does not stand for the proposition for which
it is asserted.
' See supra note 85.
"® See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
... For a discussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act cases, see supra note 139
and accompanying text. But see infra Part IVA
12 See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (1997).
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Ill. FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE FLSA AND
THE FTLA
The differences between the FLSA and the FULA are
numerous, and are too great to permit wholesale importation
of the reasoning from FLSA case law to decide FMLA ques-
tions. Courts should be cautious of applying the results or
reasoning of cases interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act
to issues arising under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
Moreover, there is considerable tension between the FLSA's
position as a labor standard and the FML's anti-discriminato-
ry function, 3 tension that should further discourage use of
the FLSA when deciding FMLA issues.
First, the FMLA and the FLSA are philosophically very
distinct. Fundamentally, the FLSA and the FMLA are intend-
ed to accomplish different purposes and provide for different
rights. Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 due to a dramati-
cally changing workforce and a decline in working conditions
in the late 1930s." This act was designed to govern and pro-
tect the basic rights of American workers.' The essential
features of the FLSA are its prohibition of oppressive child la-
bor," its establishment of a minimum wage,97 and its re-
strictions on maximum work hours."8 These basic protections
and prohibitions are "necessary for [the] health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers... ."' As a result, the FLSA
imposes both duties and prohibitions on employers, in addition
to creating an employee entitlement to a minimum wage. The
FLSA also prohibits employers from retaliating against em-
ployees for their involvement in reporting violations of the
' The FIMA was originally conceived as an anti-discrimination statute. Even
though some members of Congress considered it a new minimum labor standard
comparable to the FLSA, the language of the FMAU repudiates that contention.
Unfortunately, many courts also have the mistaken view that the FTA is a
minimum labor standard, when it is more accurately characterized as an anti-dis-
crimination statute. See supra Part fl.B.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 135, at 195.
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 212, 203() (1994).
19 Id § 206.
1 Id- § 207.
19 Id. § 202(a).
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statute or for seeking the statute's protections. 2"0 The FLSA
also provides for both criminal and civil penalties to be as-
sessed against employers who violate its provisions.20 '
The Family and Medical Leave Act, on the other hand,
deals with just one issue. Simply, the FMLA prohibits discrimi-
nation and retaliation against employees who have family
responsibilities that may occasionally interfere with their
jobs.0 2 The FMLA bars such discrimination by creating an
entitlement to leave under exceptional circumstances, and by
prohibiting employers from infringing on the employee's right
to enjoy that entitlement. Unlike the FLSA, there is no statu-
tory recognition that family and medical leave was "necessary
for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of work-
ers."203 Moreover, the FMLA explicitly recognizes that it is an
anti-discrimination statute,2" and not a labor statute such as
the FLSA.
The second area of substantive difference between the
FLSA and the FMLA is the fact that the statutes do not pro-
vide for similar remedies and enforcement mechanisms. The
FLSA distinguishes between a violator who is a person and a
violating employer.2°' The Fair Labor Standards Act subjects
a person to a fine of up to $10,000 and/or to imprisonment of
up to six months.0 6 In contrast, an employer that violates
the FLSA is liable for the amount of money which the employ-
ee would have received had there been no violation of the stat-
ute.0 7
200 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994).
201 Id. § 216(a)-(b). The criminal penalties are significant: an employer found to
have violated the FLSA faces a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up
to six months. Id. §216(a).
202 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994).
2" See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a)(6); 2601(b)(4)-(5); 2615(a)(2) (1994). Courts
interpreting the FMLA have also recognized the statute's anti.discriminatory na-
ture. See, e.g., Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441 (E.D.
Tenn. 1995).
20 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)-(b) (1994).
206 Id. § 216(a).
201 Id. §216(b). For example, if the employer violated the overtime or minimum
wage provisions of the FLSA, it would be liable for the amount of the unpaid
wages or overtime compensation. Equitable relief, such as reinstatement or promo-
tion, is also available under section 216(b).
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The Family and Medical Leave Act, in contrast, provides
only for civil remedies, 8 and holds only the employer liable
for violations of the Act. Unlike the FLSA, there is nothing in
the enforcement section of the FMLA which purports to hold a
person individually liable for a violation of the Act. There are
no criminal penalties for violation of the FMLA, and imprison-
ment is not available as a punishment." The FIMA's reme-
dies are reinstatement, backpay and benefits, and liquidated
damages in instances of wilfull violations of the statute.'
These comprehensive differences between the statutory reme-
dies available under the FLSA and the FMLA highlight the
comparative regard in which Congress holds the two statutes.
Because Congress has imposed criminal sanctions for FLSA
violations, it is apparent that Congress deemed imprisonment
a necessary deterrent to ensure the welfare and safety of
American workers. In stark contrast, Congress imposed no
correlative punishment for FMLA violations. If Congress had
really intended the FMLA to create a new minimum labor
standard similar in nature and kind to the FLSA, it would
have ensured that criminal penalties were available. In short,
the harsh penalties that may be levied for FLSA violations
make it clear that Congress deems the FLSA much more im-
portant to American workers than the FMLA. Otherwise,
FMIA penalties would have been closer in kind and degree to
those of the FLSA.
This analysis of the statutory penalties under the FLSA
and the FMLA serves to point out another compelling reason
why the FLSA is not an appropriate guide for interpreting the
FMLA. The FLSA-within its statutory structure-provides for
penalizing persons and employers. The statute takes pains to
distinguish the two.21' The FMLA, however, provides only
that the employer be penalized for violating the Act. Even
though the Code of Federal Regulations purports to point out
similarities between the FLSA and the FMLA regarding the
issue of individual liability, the structure of the statute directly
29 U.S.C. § 2617 (1994).
2 I&L This difference alone is sufficient to distinguish the FLSA from the
FMLA, since only a person may be imprisoned, not an employer.
210 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (1994).
21 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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contradicts this proposition.212 If Congress had intended per-
sons to be individually liable for FMIA violations, it logically
would have patterned the FMLA more closely to the structure
of the FLSA by distinguishing between persons and employers.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statutes do not
cover the same constituencies. The FLSA, while providing for
limited exemptions, 213 applies across the board to any indus-
try affecting commerce.214 Virtually all American workers are
protected in one way or another by the FLSA. The FMLA,
however, applies only to businesses which employ fifty or more
employees. 25 Because of this selective application, it is esti-
mated that "approximately ninety-five percent of all businesses
and from forty to fifty percent of all United States employees"
are excluded from the coverage of the FMNLA. 16 It is difficult
to see how Congress could rationally assert that the FMELA is a
minimum labor standard when it affects such a comparatively
small percentage of workers, and so few businesses. 21 More-
over, because FMILA leave is unpaid, only those employees who
can afford to take it are likely to invoke the statute's
protections.218 On the other hand, the protections of the
FLSA are available regardless of whether employees can afford
to take advantage of them.
21 See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
2'3 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994).
21" The FLSA's coverage originally was dependent on an employee's job duties,
not on the nature or type of the employer's business. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 135,
at 197. The FLSA was amended in 1961 to extend its reach on the basis of an
employer's business. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 130, at 197. Congress intended the
FLSA "to extend to the limits of the commerce clause." ROTHSTEIN, supra note
135, at 197. In contrast, the FMLA does not define its coverage by the nature of
the employee's job duties, but by the nature of the employer's business, exempting
businesses with fewer than fifty employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994).
2's 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (1994). This exemption was a long-time obstacle to
the Act's eventual passage. See ELVING, supra note 41, at 96. The small business
exemption, as originally estimated by the General Accounting Officer, would ex-
clude from coverage all but the largest five percent of the nation's businesses.
ELVING, supra note 41, at 96.
216 Tysse, supra note 29, at 361-62. Another source estimates that the FMLA
affects 44% of all workers and a scant five percent of the nation's employers.
Lynne Curry-Swann, We Can Fire Her-Can't We?, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWs, Nov.
11, 1996, at ID.
217 Instead, the FMLA's coverage makes the statute look even more like other
anti-discrimination statutes, which also exclude small businesses from its coverage.
21 Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 29, at 48-51.
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These great disparities between the purposes, protections,
provisions, remedies and coverage of the FLSA and the FMLA
severely weaken the ability of a court to rationally rely on
reasoning from FLSA cases when deciding issues arising under
the FMLA. The FLSA and the FMLA are too dissimilar to
allow undifferentiated analyses, especially when courts are
considering a basic, threshold issue such as individual versus
business entity liability.
IV. MODEST PROPOSALS FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF SUPERVISORY
LIABILITY UNDER THE FMLA
A. The FMLA as an Anti-Discrimination Statute
The antidiscrimination aspect2w of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act is directly related to the issue of individual lia-
bility. In Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc.,' the
court held that the term "employer" in the FILA should be
construed the same as the term is construed under Title
VII . The Frizzell court's analysis of Title VII thoroughly
examined the question of individual liability and provides a
framework through which to view the FMLA as an anti-dis-
crimination statute.' After examining case law from across
the nation,' the court held that individuals who are not oth-
erwise employers' may not be held liable for violations of
the FMIA. Though the court gave scant attention to the
21 See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
906 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). Title VII defines 'employer' in relevant
part as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees . . . and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
See supra Part I.B.
The court pointed out that of the eight circuits which had clearly addressed
the issue under Title VII, all had concluded that individuals may not be held
liable under the statute. Id. at 447. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313
(2d Cir. 1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) cert denied,
117 S.Ct. 110 (1996); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276,
1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995);
Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403-04 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Birlkbech v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1994); Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America, 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d
477, 480 (10th Cir. 1994).
See supra Part I.B.
Frizzel, 906 F. Supp. at 449.
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differences between the statutory definitions of "employer" in
the FMLA and Title VII,2 6 the analysis is still sound.
The Frizzell court stated that Congress intended to 'in-
corporate respondeat superior principles under Title VII, the
remedies under Title VII are remedies an employer, not an
individual would provide, and individual liability under Title
VII is inconsistent with the limitation of its reach to employers
with fifteen or more employees .... 227 The court applied a
similar rationale to the FMLA.228 The fact that the FMLA ap-
plies only to businesses with fifty or more employees is prima
facie evidence that Congress did not desire to burden small
businesses with the expense of providing family leave and the
costs of litigating FMLA claims.229 If Congress was so con-
cerned with protecting small businesses, as former Senator
Dole was," 9 then it is illogical to assume that Congress in-
tended that individuals would bear the costs and burdens of
compliance and litigation that it had refused to place on small
businesses.
In fact, holding individuals liable for violations of the Fam-
ily and Medical Leave Act runs contrary to the intent of Con-
gress. If individuals are personally liable under the Act, then
the entire rationale for the exemption for businesses with few-
er than fifty employees is lost, leading to unequal treatment of
supervisory employees. If individuals who work for a company
with more than fifty employers are liable for FMLA violations,
there is little fairness in not holding liable an individual who
' Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (1994), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
906 F. Supp. at 449. See also John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Lia.
bility of Supervisors, 210 N.Y.L.J., 46 at 3 (Sept. 3, 1993); Christopher Greer,
Note, 'Who, Me?: A Supervisors Individual Liability for Discrimination in the
Workplace, 62 FORDHAMi L. REV. 1835 (1994).
2Id.
See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that it was "inconceivable" that a Congress concerned with protecting
small businesses would allow civil liability to run against individual employees);
accord Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; See also Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649,
651-53 (5th Cir. 1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.
1991); Coraggio v. Time, Inc., No. 94-5429, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5399, at *22-27
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1995). Cf AMC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d at 1280-81
(holding that there is no individual liability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act because of the statute's exclusion of businesses with fewer than fifteen employ-
ees).
2 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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is employed by a business with fewer than fifty employees.
There is no statutory support for classifying supervisory em-
ployees on this basis, holding some liable and exempting oth-
ers. It is clear that Congress exempted small businesses from
FMLA coverage because it intended for liability to run against
the business-entity employer, not against an individual. The
liability exemption affects a class of businesses-not a class of
individuals. Congress' exclusion of small businesses reveals
that individual liability was not its goal. Therefore, only busi-
nesses should be liable for violations of the FMLA.
Additionally, the text of the statute, the incorporation of
respondeat superior principles in the definition of "employ-
er,"231 and the nature of the remedies 2 all indicate that
the FMZLA imposes liability solely on the corporate entity and
not on individuals in supervisory positions.'
B. The Argument for Corporate Liability
The best supporting argument for limiting FAMLA liability
to the employing entity is based on economic efficiencies. Given
the complexities of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
ambiguity of the legislative intent, and the equivocation of its
implementing regulations, it makes eminent sense for a court
"to look at the underlying rationale of the FMLA At its core,
the purpose behind the FMLA is straightforward.' It pre-
vents discrimination against workers by providing unpaid
leave for employees who need to take care of personal or family
obligations. The burden of the congressional mandate falls
upon businesses-not upon individuals.'
2" See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1313-14; infra Part IV.B.
Id& at 1314-15. See also infra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part I.B.
The main contention of the Acts opponents is that it hurts business, smaller
businesses in particular. This argument has been the opposition's central thesis for
twelve years. There exists no evidence to suggest that a single opponent of the
Act argued that the FMLA would adversely affect supervisory employees, nor that
a single proponent of the Act intended that individuals would bear the burdens of
non-compliance. Such a proposition did not exist. See ELVING, supra note 41, at
289-90, describing the extensive, and ultimately unfruitful, efforts of the National
Federation of Independent Business ("NFIB") to derail the FMLA. The leaders of
the NFIB "saw family leave as the first part of 'a new wave of quasi-social busi-
ness legislation where business is asked to take on more and more of the social
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The corporate entity is in the best position to implement
the family-friendly policies of the FMLA. The business entity
has the resources, the skills, the staff and the experience to
ensure that its leave policy is carried out in a manner consis-
tent with the FMLA. Moreover, because the business will bear
the burden of litigating any employee claims under the Act, it
has a strong incentive to comply with the FMLA. Such compli-
ance contemplates adequate training of supervisory employees
to ensure that they are familiar with the requirements of the
FMLA, and that they are equipped to handle employee leave
requests. The incentive for strict compliance is the avoidance of
litigation costs, employee dissatisfaction, and supervisor uncer-
tainty. The employer-entity stands in the best position to en-
sure that the actions of its employees do not subject the com-
pany to FMLA liability.1
6
The realities of the modern workplace also lean strongly in
favor of confining Family and Medical Leave Act liability to the
employer-entity. The FMLA's definitions fail to take into ac-
count the fact that there may be many levels of corporate gov-
ernance. For example, a bank teller, in coordinating his or her
benefits with the employer, may have dealings with the head
teller at the branch, the branch manager, the corporate human
resources manager, and on up the chain of corporate com-
mand-a chain which includes support personnel such as ad-
ministrative assistants, secretaries and receptionists. If the
employer fails to enact leave policies that abide by the man-
dates of the FMLA, who is really responsible for the violation?
What happens if the faulty family and medical leave policy
was written by an outside human resources consulting firm
and the individuals responsible for its administration just went
"by the book?" Given the fact that remedies under the FMLA
are limited, 7 it seems logical that the employer entity is in
the best situation to answer for potential suits over FMLA
costs.'" ELVING, supra note 41, at 289.
" This is, of course, the classic common law argument for the application of
respondeat superior. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
" 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (1994). Monetary damages may be levied up to the amount
denied to or lost by an employee as a result of the violation, and may be doubled
for a willful violation of the Act. Equitable relief, in the form of reinstatement or
promotion is also available. See supra Part III. The employer entity is, of course,
in the best position to supply these remedies.
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violations. A recognition of these everyday issues leads to the
conclusion that the policies behind family and medical leave,
and its enforcement, are best enacted and enforced by the legal
entity which employs an employee. It is the legal employing
entity-the real employer in the dictionary sense of the
word 8 -that should answer for FMLA violations.
Moreover, the statutory remedies for FMLA violations are
best provided by the corporate entity. This argument is best
supported by considering the equitable remedies provided by
the FMLA. While a corporate entity may easily make the deci-
sion to hire, promote, or reinstate a prevailing employee, indi-
vidual supervisors likely lack the ability to unilaterally take
such action.
Fairness is also a consideration that leads to the conclu-
sion that individual liability under the FILA makes little
sense. Given the complexities of the modern workplace, many
supervisors oversee the work of employees who earn salaries
equal to or greater than the supervisor. A supervisor who vio-
lates the FMIA may find him- or herself liable for damages in
an amount up to twice the aggrieved employee's lost salary.
While such a situation could bankrupt an individual supervi-
sor, the corporate entity would be better situated financially to
absorb such costs. Moreover, the business entity should be
encouraged to take the responsibility to implement lawful
leave policies, and train its supervisors to ensure compliance.
This type of encouragement will make the FMLA more socially,
as well as economically, efficient. If a mistake is made, the
business-not the supervisor-should answer for the violation.
This principle is really nothing more than a variation of
common law liability theory. The doctrine of respondeat superi-
or holds that an employer must answer for the wrongful acts of
its employees when those acts are taken in the course of em-
ployment. 9 Under the FVILA, any action regarding leave
that a supervisor might take in relation to a subordinate em-
ployee is taken in the course of employment. But for the em-
ployment relationship, there can be no FMLA protection.
Therefore, the alleged violation of the Act will always be an
"official" act, and liability for such wrongful acts should flow
" See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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through the employee to the employer. Adoption of this com-
mon law employment doctrine will streamline FMLA litigation
by assuring that the aggrieved employee names the proper
entity in a lawsuit. Doing so will lessen litigation costs because
there will be no question that the pleading is adequate, cutting
down on expensive and time-consuming "motion practice." The
aggrieved employee will have greater assurance of a remedy
because of the greater likelihood that the employee will have
access to a corporation's "deep pockets."" ° There is no such
guarantee of recovery in a suit against an individual supervi-
sor.
CONCLUSION
Individual liability under the Family and Medical Leave
Act is not supported by the language and structure of the Act,
its implementing regulations, nor its underlying purpose.
Moreover, the FMLA's similarity to other anti-discrimination
statutes and the fact that the business entity is better situated
to comply with and absorb the costs of the FMLA, demon-
strates the senselessness of holding supervisors personally
liable for FMLA violations. The Fair Labor Standards Act,
because of its many incongruities with the FMLA, lends no
support for individual liability under the FMLA. Faced with
the confusion resulting from a statute that was transmogrified
over the space of eight years in order to placate myriad constit-
uencies, courts should not look for easy answers to guide their
interpretation of the statute. There is no support for imposing
individual liability under the FMLA. Restricting liability to the
business entity is not only the most economically and socially
efficient solution to the problem, but also the wisest for the
administration of a flexible, family-conscious workplace.
Boyd Rogers
240 See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1315 (noting that a plaintiff will rarely file a suit
against the supervisor alone because the chance for recovery from the employer
entity is much greater).
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